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Razzle-Dazzle
Allan C Hutchinson

*

As their title suggests, ‘legal philosophers’ are more philosophers than
lawyers; they are in the business of thinking generally about law
rather than doing law in any practical way. While lawyers tend to be
jurisdiction-specific in their affiliations and competence, legal
philosophers are under no such restriction. They are not only free
to roam broadly and deeply, but many feel a professional obligation
to do so. At their most ambitious, legal philosophers claim dominion
over a jurisprudential realm that is delineated by neither
geography nor history. Indeed, presenting

themselves as

intellectual citizens of the whole legal world, their crafted
contributions are intended to be judged not by the contingent
standards of local usefulness, but by the pure canons of universal
validity. As such, the professional commitment and authority of
legal philosophers is based upon their capacity to

*
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parochial matters of law, but in a way that rises above and is not
reducible to their local circumstances. Accordingly, while these legal
philosophers might talk about morality and politics as they
relate to law, they do so only in the most theoretical and
abstract terms. For them, philosophy inhabits the realm of ‘truth
and necessity’ in which the contingent and the local holds little or
no analytical sway.
The contemporary champion of legal philosophy is undoubtedly
Joseph Raz. His extensive and sophisticated work represents the
high-water mark of analytical jurisprudence. With the recent
publication of Between Authority and Interpretation, he has provided an
accessible and stylish showcase of his philosophical theory of law
that is as rigorous and demanding as it is provocative and
controversial. Because this book builds on as it clarifies and
develops the main themes of his work over the past four decades, it
offers itself as a convenient focus for a more general assessment of
Raz’s whole oeuvre.1 In traversing law’s terrain, he is adamant that,
whatever the purposes and methods of other disciplines (sociology,
history, anthropology, etc), any philosophical analysis worth its name
must concern itself with delivering insights and understanding about
law that are of universal significance. While general conclusions
about local laws and systems are important and helpful, they will have
no philosophical value unless they can say something general and
enduring about law as an institutional phenomenon. A corollary of this
is that legal philosophy must insulate itself from contingent moral
and political influences that will compromise or contaminate its

project of making statements about law’s nature and operation that
are not only universally valid, but also locally accurate. As Raz
himself puts it, ‘where necessity reigns, considerations of moral and
political desirability have no role to play’.2
In this essay, I intend to challenge Raz’s philosophical
ambitions—and, therefore, much contemporary work in legal
philosophy—by concentrating on his

crucial methodological

distinction between the local and contingent and the universal
and necessary. It will be my contention that, as there are no places
where ‘moral and political desirability’ do not play a role,
‘necessity’ has no reign. Accordingly, I will argue that legal
philosophy

cannot live

up to its own

methodological

expectations and standards of validation. For all its impressive
erudition and sophistication, therefore, Raz’s work is a
manifesto of ‘local enthusiasms’ that, while instructive and useful
in themselves, can lay no claim to reveal the necessary features of
law’s existence. His work comprises some very contingent and
localised generalisations that no amount of philosophical razzledazzle can elevate to universal and global truths about law.
Blinded by the philosophical light, there is more formal brilliance
than substantive bottom-line to Raz’s jurisprudence.
There are many different arguments that might be made against
Raz’s account of law, but I will concentrate on three in particular.3
After introducing the main themes in Raz’s jurisprudence, I will
devote my critical attention to the dubious philosophical status
of his philosophical project, the elusive nature of his

law/morality distinction, and the flawed depiction of legal
interpretation’s role. Throughout, I will suggest that, while there
are many local enthusiasms that Raz exhibits and to which I can
subscribe, none of these merit the universal authority that he
claims for them. Finally, while there is much that is insightful and
profound about Raz’s ideas, he also has a tendency for opacity and
oracularity. As such, I hope to offer a robust challenge to Raz’s
Between Authority and Interpretation without disrespecting it.

I. NO ORDINARY JOE

It can be safely reported that Joseph Raz is now considered the
leading positivist and, arguably, the leading jurist of his time. Once
a student of HLA Hart, he is now giving his former mentor a run for
his money in the jurisprudential sweepstakes. Furthermore, he is
more than a match for Ronald Dworkin, also a student of Hart’s, in
persuading jurists of the pertinence of his own positivist account of
law. In Between Authority and Interpretation, he offers further
reflections on legal philosophy and

provides some telling

clarifications and defences of his own theory of law. While the book’s
13 chapters have almost all been previously published, their
compilation allows and invites a sustained re-appraisal of the basic
ideas and arguments which he has been developing over the course of
his long career. In this regard, it is a veritable tour de force. Although a
demanding read that expects much of its readers,4 the book is a

wonderful exemplar of Raz’s style and oeuvre for better and for
worse.
What defines and distinguishes positivists is their approach to the
relationship between law and morality. For the most part, they fully
accept and recognise that law

and morality are inextricably

connected as a historical matter of social fact and that morality
features in a variety of ways in determining law’s nature. However,
they

maintain that an analytical approach to law requires, as a

matter of philosophical clarity, that the issue of law’s validity be
understood in terms of social sources, not moral merits: ‘legal
positivism is normatively inert’.5 Accordingly, while all law has an
inevitable moral content and should be evaluated in terms of its
moral worth, positivists maintain that its existence and identity as
law not only can, but must be determined without taking any kind of
stand on its moral substance.
Raz’s reputation and high standing rest on the distinctive
and powerful contribution that he has made to jurisprudential
efforts to develop, fine-tune and defend this basic positivist stance.
His ideas are starkly positivist in ambition and realisation; there has
been an enviable constancy of both purpose and performance in his
writings. While his account of law as a body of authoritative rules
holds much intuitive appeal, the genius (as well as the devil) is in the
details of his exposition of the relationship between law and morality.
Accordingly, it is important to explore his sophisticated elaborations
of conceptual analysis, legal interpretation and legal authority in
order to grasp the appeal and force of Raz’s theory of law and its

special brand of legal positivism. In so doing, it is instructive to
distinguish Raz’s idea of law from both those of other positivist
theorists and those of positivism’s antagonists.6 It then
becomes possible to get a more nuanced feel for his
philosophically dense thesis about the nature of law. Indeed, for Raz,
those positivists and non-positivists share much more with each other
than with his own legal theory. A non-positivist account of law insists
that a full conceptual account of legal

validity demands close

interpretive attention to its moral content and normative purposes.
At their most generous, non-positivists contend that it is not so much
that

positivism is entirely wrong-headed in its analysis and

recommendations, rather it is seriously incomplete due to its failure to
recognise and accept its broader evaluative dimensions; it ignores the
vital appreciation that law’s social facts have inescapable moral
components. For instance, Dworkin’s law-as-integrity model of law
holds to the line that ‘propositions of law are true if they figure
in or follow from the

principles of justice, fairness, and

procedural due process that provide the best

constructive

interpretation of the community’s legal practice’.7 As even positivists
concede,

law

(whether

in

the

form

of

constitutional

provisions, legislative enactments or common law rules) is shot
through with moral terms and evaluative standards—reasonable
care,

fair

dealing,

honesty,

good

faith

conduct,

etc.

Consequently, modern positivists are obliged to make a much
better fist of explaining and defending their defining ‘separation
thesis’. In particular, the most

pressing

challenge

is

to

demonstrate convincingly how these obvious moral occurrences
in legal rules can be squared with the positivists’ rigorous insistence on
the split between law and morality.
There were two distinctive responses from positivists.8 One came
from Hart and his followers. They took the softer line that, although
law and morality must be kept analytically distinct, moral values
can still be incorporated and feature in determining matters
of legal validity; their inclusion does not require any
independent judgement about their moral truth and does not ask
jurists to take a stand on their controversial quality. As such, law’s
identity can still be determined by its source-based pedigree, not its
intrinsic moral merit. While this more ‘inclusive’ mode of positivism
goes a long way to accommodating the non-positivist critique, it does
so at the considerable cost of reducing the supposed differences
between positivists and non-positivists almost to vanishing point.
Indeed, there is much merit to Dworkin’s triumphalist claim that this
version of positivism is ‘stunningly like my own’ and that it is ‘hard to
see any genuine difference’.9 Soft theorists maintained their
positivist faith, but at the cost of their jurisprudential souls.
Raz was and is having none of this. He insists that legal norms
must be capable of being identified strictly by their pedigree alone
and without reference to moral criteria. In regard to his soft
positivist cousins, he is adamant that to allow the incorporation
of moral standards in any way as part and parcel of legal rules would
severely and perhaps fatally compromise the separation thesis.
For him, it is

axiomatic that the identification of law and its

content be achieved ‘without resort to moral considerations’10 if
positivism is to be secure against the non-positivists’ criticisms. As
such, Raz holds steadfast to the claim that law’s identity must be
determined exclusively by reference to factual sources only. The
law’s apparent incorporation of moral standards is nothing more
than ‘an indication that certain considerations are not excluded’.11
It most certainly is not a recognition that those moral standards are
part of law qua moral standards.
More precisely, Raz explains that it is not that law excludes
morality, rather it ‘modifies … the way moral considerations
apply’.12 For instance, in the same way that conflicts-of-law rules
give temporary legal effect to foreign laws in specified situations
without making them part of the law itself, some constitutional rules
give legal effect to certain moral norms without making them part
of the law itself. In both cases, contrary to the claims of the inclusive,
soft or incorporationist positivist, foreign law and morality are not
incorporated into the law and thereby become part of the law. Moral
standards are treated much the same as rules of financial
accounting or actuarial tables; they are relied on and resorted to
by judges and

lawyers, but they do not become part of law and,

therefore, count as law by that fact. As such, law ‘concretiz[es] moral
principles’13 and, having done so, turns them into social facts, not
moral values. In this way, issues of legal validity and moral legitimacy
are kept conceptually separate.
Accordingly, if soft positivists maintain that there are no necessary
connections between law and morality, it might be thought that hard

positivists would insist that there are necessarily no connections
between law and morality. But this is not entirely accurate. Hard
positivists argue that, while there are many connections between
law and morality, law’s identity does not depend at all on its meeting
any test of moral legitimacy; law is entirely source-based in its claims to
validity and moral considerations have nothing to offer and no role to
play in such inquiries. As such, legal rules are held to be strictly
social phenomena that can be identified in an

entirely objective

and factual way by reference to an uncontested source of authority;
there is an analytically unbridgeable chasm between formal
pedigree and moral

substance. In direct opposition to the soft

positivists, Raz resists the moralist-inspired criticisms and stands firm
in his defence of an uncompromising positivist account of law and
legal systems.
From a Razian perspective, therefore, law exists and functions as
both a fact and a norm. It is a social fact in that ‘its existence and
content can be established … without reliance on moral
arguments’.14 This means that there can be good and bad laws as
well as morally legitimate or illegitimate legal systems: inquiries
into what the law is are separate from what the law ought to be.
While law can by its nature be used to realise valuable ends and
can be considered to have a variety of moral tasks to perform, law is
not by its nature a morally valuable institution, even if it is morally
significant.15 History has shown time and again that law has been
used, in big and small ways, for immoral purposes. However, law is
also normative in that ‘it aims to guide people’s conduct and it

claims authority to do so’.16 Although it may fail to make good on
its claim, its authority flows from its theoretical capacity to do so.
It is this idea of ‘authority’ that lies at the heart of Raz’s
jurisprudence. For him, a legal system comprises those rules that
seek to offer a rational and authoritative guide to human conduct. It
is not so much whether that system and its rules have actual
authority, but whether they can make a plausible and practical
claim to legitimate authority in a particular society. As such, law is
an institutionally backed set of reasons for people to do or not do
things. Legal rules operate as place-markers for substantive reasons.
It is Raz’s contention that people comply with rules rather than
determine for themselves what would be the right thing to do in
particular circumstances: ‘the law is a special kind of reason for it
displaces the reasons which it is meant to reflect’.17 These rules must
be identifiable as social facts and, therefore,

be capable of

identification without resort to non-legal or evaluative moral criteria.
If the rules cannot be identified and followed in this way, they are no
longer serving their primary normative function and, therefore,
cannot make the practical difference that they are intended to
make and upon which their authority is based. As such, law is an
authoritative system of norms that must be identifiable and
serviceable on its own terms. If it is not, then its authority is illusory
and such norms no longer qualify as legal rules, whatever their
appeal and authority as moral,

religious or other value-based

directives.18
There is so much that is rewarding and insightful about Raz’s

work. There is a reassuring sharpness to the distinctions made, an
unflinching commitment to analytical rigour, and a welcome
confidence in demarcating law’s nature and operation. However,
there is also much that is off-putting and obfuscating. Raz tends to be
philosophically extravagant in the claims he makes for his
analytical conclusions. None of this is helped by the clotted nature
of some of his prose.

II. FROM UNIVERSAL TO PAROCHIAL AND BACK

In recent years, legal theory has taken a decidedly ‘methodological’
turn. While the main focus of jurisprudential engagement largely
remains the ‘separation thesis’, considerable attention has been
given to the prior epistemological question of

whether it is

possible to intervene in the law/morality issue in a way that is itself
untouched or uncontaminated by moral values or other evaluative
criteria. It is no longer sufficient for jurists to support their
theoretical claims about ‘what law is’; they must also defend the
deeper status of those theoretical claims. It has become a matter of
showing not only what propositions are true about law’s nature, but
also what it means for those propositions to be true.19 The
especial challenge for

positivists is that, in defending the

separation of law and morality, they must ensure that their
jurisprudential explanation is itself not breached by ideological or
partial values.

Raz has always made it plain that he is in the business of
disclosing ‘universal truths’. A great strength of his brand of legal
positivism is claimed to be that it makes and defends its central
insights as truth-claims that apply wherever and whenever law is
found. For him, therefore, the main task of legal philosophy is to
establish ‘the kind of institution that law is’20 by ascertaining ‘a set of
systematically-related true propositions about the nature of law’21
that can assert universal validity by virtue of their philosophicallynecessary status. While a theory must be capable of applying to ‘all the
legal systems which ever existed or that could exist’,22 he gladly
concedes that there will be local variations and deviations in terms of
law’s boundaries at particular times; it is the core or standard case
that Raz maintains should engage the legal

philosopher’s

attention and concerns. Accordingly, when it comes to the
epistemological status of Raz’s inquiry, it is resoundingly clear that
he offers his conclusions as being universally true and that,
‘where necessity reigns, considerations of moral and political
desirability have no role to play’.23 It is

unapologetically

presented as legal theory on a grand scale and in a grand style.
In the past decade, as part of the methodological turn in legal
theory, critics of the analytical project have noted that the universal
claims that legal theorists like Raz

make for their theoretical

observations are extravagant and indefensible. The basic thrust of
the critique is that, despite the universal ambitions of positivists
in elucidating the nature of law, their efforts are very much
entrenched in the parochial conditions of late twentieth-century

western industrialised societies. While these philosophical accounts
of law have much to tell us about the nature of law in those societies,
they do little to illuminate the nature of law in other societies. There
are so many other legal arrangements—tribal, transnational,
indigenous, customary, etc—that do not comply with this centralised,
top-down, state-centred model of law and governance. As such, Raz
commits the familiar philosophical error of mistaking one contested
and contingent understanding of law as its unifying and universal
essence. As Raz himself correctly sums up this objection, ‘it is a
parochial study of an aspect of our culture rather than universal
study of the nature of law’.24
In Between Authority and Interpretation, Raz acknowledges this line
of critique and attempts to deflect its debilitating effects.25 He is
insistent that these critical allegations are ‘misguided’26 and do
not unduly hamper or hobble the theoretical status of his
jurisprudential project. However, he does introduce several important
alterations and significant qualifications to his account of law.
Although they are offered in the form of clarifications and suggest
that there has been no substantial switch of position, it seems
obvious that this is not the case. More importantly, these changes in
his position are not only far from convincing, but they actually do
serious damage to the cogency and strength of his theoretical claims.
Rather than refute the ‘parochial’ concerns, Raz manages to
confirm their critical bite. There is much intellectual razzamatazz,
but it does little to advance our substantive understanding of legal
theory that his critics or even Raz would demand.

In order to understand Raz’s response, it is necessary to
provide a more

thorough account of his own particular

jurisprudential methodology. Building on Hart’s notion of an
‘internal attitude’,27 Raz insists that any account of law’s nature
must draw upon and accommodate the self-understanding of
participants in the legal system: ‘it is part of the selfconsciousness of our society to see certain

institutions as

legal’.28 This means that legal philosophy is not a detached exercise
in academic taxonomy; it is devoted to ‘inquiring into the
typology of social institutions, not into the semantic of terms’.29 By
entering into such an inquiry, the purpose is to apprehend the
‘concept of law’ by, among other things, ‘explaining the conditions
for minimal possession of the concept, that is those, essential or
nonessential, properties of what the concept is a concept of,
knowledge of which is

necessary for the person to have the

concept at all, however incomplete his or her mastery of it may be’.30
Consequently, the Raz-influenced jurist will be concerned to isolate
and refine the concept of law which people hold and which will
influence their society’s governance and exercise of authority.
Importantly, there is no need for people to have a full appreciation
of the concept of law in order for it to be of practical significance in
their social practices and lives.
The difficulty, as Raz concedes, is that, if such concepts of law are
embedded in societies and are for that reason culturally specific,
how is it possible to maintain the claim that the resulting
conclusions about the nature of law are not themselves culturally

specific? It is at this point that the philosophical waters start to
become very muddy. Raz states that ‘while the concept of law is
parochial, ie not all societies have it, our inquiry is universal in that
it explores the nature of law, wherever it is to be found’.31 In
explicating further why concepts of law might be parochial, but why
legal theory is not and might still be considered to be universal, Raz
goes on to say:

This means that in legal theory there is a tension between the parochial and
the universal. It is both parochial and universal. On the one hand it is
parochial, for it aims to explain an institution designated by a
concept that is a local concept, a product of modern

western

civilisation. On the other hand it is universal theory for it applies to law
whenever and wherever it can conceivably be, and its existence does not
presuppose the existence of its concept, indeed it does not presuppose
the existence of any legal concept.32

Insofar as I understand this claim, Raz seems to be suggesting
that all legal theorising begins with the concept of law in our own
societies. Having fixed its terms (eg, an authoritative system of
rules that can be fixed without resort to moral considerations),
we then survey all societies across time and geography and
determine whether their social practices can be said to instantiate
such a concept. If they do, they have law and, if they do not, they do
not have law, at least according to our own concept of law. It is not
decisive that those people in other cultures do not share our
concept of law. If their social practices gel with the essential conditions

of our concept of law, they will have a legal system: ‘legal theory is
merely the study of the necessary features of law, given “our”
concept of law’.33
While this explanation has a veneer of plausibility, it surely does
not bear close scrutiny. Contrary to the original universalistic claims of
much analytical philosophy

generally

and

legal

philosophy

particularly, Raz’s clarifications manage to pull the universal rug
from under his own feet and reveal him to be standing squarely on very
parochial ground. And if his feet are firmly planted on the local soil
of contingent cultural practices, it is impossible to grasp how his
philosophical peregrinations can escape those confines and continue
to lay claim to universal validity. The most that his modified
parochial-universal approach can do is to clarify which other societies
in the world have legal systems like our own and which do not.
This does not so much deflect the criticism that he is merely
theorising about the nature of law in the parochial conditions of late
twentieth-century Western industrialised societies as confirm it. As
importantly, he privileges that particular account of law’s essential
nature by foisting it upon the world across both territory and history.
A presumable corollary of Raz’s efforts to negotiate the tension
between the

parochial and the universal is that each society

might well develop its own legal theory à la Raz in line with its own
concept of law. This would mean that there would be as many legal
theories as there were concepts of law. Moreover, on Raz’s account,
each would be able to argue that they were involved in a truly
philosophical enterprise in that conclusions about the nature of

law would also be able to claim universal legitimacy. In such
circumstances, the best we can note is that there would many
different concepts of law, as many different theories of law, and
many incommensurable yet universal conclusions about the nature
of law. Such a world would not only be baffling to the uncommitted
observer, it would defy any notion that legal philosophers had
anything special, let alone ‘necessarily true’, to say about law’s nature.
Raz’s response to this is blunt, but not to the point and entirely
unconvincing: ‘the objectivity and universality of the theory of law
is not affected by the fact that the concept of law (which is our
concept of law) is parochial and not shared by all the people nor by
all the cultures, which live or lived under the law’.34 This response is
hardly reassuring for the jurisprudential adept, but it will be warmly
received by those pragmatic theorists who challenge the
universalistic claims of analytical theorists. The Razian study of
law and legal systems may be universal, but its parameters and
the conclusions reached are surely not. Whatever Raz claims to be
doing, he is no longer, if he ever was, in the game of explaining law’s
nature as ‘a set of systematically-related true propositions about the
nature of law’.35 Or, if he is, the whole nature of what counts as
truth and necessity has been radically transformed to such an
extent that the philosophical space between the parochial and
universal has been almost totally elided.
Raz places much faith in the existence of ‘our’ concept of law.
But there are so many difficulties with fleshing out what is referenced
by this ‘our’. While there might well be a reasonably settled and

homogenous sense of ‘our’ in some societies, it is far from clear that
this is so in many other societies. Indeed, it is in those late
twentieth-century

Western

industrialised

societies

that

the

appreciation of ‘our’ is becoming highly contested and relatively thin
in scope and substance. While there will obviously be a degree of
uncertainty and indeterminacy about any concept’s precise ambit,
there may well be competing and occasionally contradictory concepts
in play at the same time in some societies. Moreover, it is not obvious
at what level of generality the concept of law as a snapshot of people’s
self-understandings needs to be made. Although there may be
certain similarities between the societies of the United Kingdom,
the United States of America or Canada and their concepts of law,
there are also crucial dissimilarities. At what point do those
dissimilarities become so significant that they take precedence over
the similarities? Without some independent conceptual metric by
which to gauge this set-off, there is a risk that every society will
have its own concept of law. Even if there was considerable
congruence among different societies’ concept of law, any conclusions
drawn would remain parochial and contingent. All of this would
surely defy any sensible way to talk about a theory of law in Raz’s
sense.
In short, contrary to Raz’s intentions, philosophical necessity
has itself been

parochialised and thereby robbed of its vaunted

qualities of theoretical authority. When Raz states that ‘where
necessity reigns, considerations of moral and political desirability
have no role to play’,36 he has simply made a rod for his own back.

By his own account, all analyses of the concept of law originate in
and are limited by the practical details of their parochial setting.
This being the case, ‘political and moral’ considerations are
inevitably in play in comprising and informing those local
conditions; they will switch and change as society itself shifts
and alters.

Consequently, if necessity only reigns where such

considerations have no role, then necessity has no purchase and,
therefore, no importance. Rather than take flight into some abstract
realm where the normal rules of earthly locomotion seemingly no
longer apply, Raz has clipped legal philosophers’ wings. More
precisely, he has revealed what critics thought all along, namely that
legal theorists have feet of clay. So, when Raz claims that ‘a claim to
necessity is in the nature of the enterprise [of legal theory]’,37 he has
not only failed to save legal philosophy from a timely demise at the
hands of his ‘parochial’ critics; he has also effectively contributed to
writing analytical jurisprudence’s and his own philosophical obituary.

III. LAW, BAD LAW AND NO LAW

Although Raz’s efforts to negotiate the tension between the
parochial and the universal undermine the philosophical status of
his overall jurisprudential project,

they also create equally

devastating problems for the positivist aspirations of his theory of
law. This is particularly evident in his account of what it means for a
legal system or law to exist as something distinct from other

normative schemes of moral or other evaluative modes of regulation.
In charting the crucial separation of law and morality, Raz’s
parochialism

(or

faux-universalism)

becomes

even

more

apparent. Indeed, if further proof was needed, the arguments he
employs to explicate the law/morality connection confirm still
further that his theory of law, insofar as it is based upon our
concept of law, is a theory of law about mid-to-late twentiethcentury Western industrialised societies.38 His theory is not only limited
in its capacity to provide informative and fruitful insights about
other societies and their ‘law’, it is also unconvincing. As Between
Authority and Interpretation amply shows, the crucial boundaries
drawn by Raz between law, bad law and non-law become fraught
with both conceptual and practical difficulty.
As Raz is at pains to point out, the essential characteristics
of law (ie, an

authoritative set of rules which exists and is

identifiable without regard to moral considerations) are those that
make law what it is and are ‘found in law wherever and whenever it
exists’.39 Being universal, the theory must be capable of applying to
‘all the legal systems which ever existed or that could exist’.40 While
law can change over time and across the world, he maintains that
the nature of law does not; it remains universal in its application
and

relevance.

However,

as

importantly,

the

essential

characteristics of law are also those without which it would no longer be
law. Consequently, if ‘the institutions and practices of a country which
constitute its law
… lose the properties which are essential to the law, … the result is

not that the law changes its nature, but that the country no longer
has a legal system’.41 For Raz, therefore, whatever else it may have,
any society that relies on a system of governance that does not exhibit
the features of a state-backed series of authoritative rules has no
legal system.42 None of this, of course, means that such a society will
not have a legal system that accords with its own concept of law; it will
simply not have a system of governance that merits being described
as ‘law’ in terms of our own concept of law. Furthermore, in keeping
with his positivist commitments, whether a legal system exists will be a
matter of factual enquiry; assessments as to whether it is a good or bad
legal system will depend on the moral content of its rules.

However, while there is a certain conceptual symmetry and
neatness to all this, it renders his whole notion of legal theory even
more recherché and precious than many already consider it to be.
If legal theorists are not trying to do more than

describe the

essential features of one or a few legal systems that presently exist in
our own societies, then it is unclear in what sense they are engaged
in a philosophical endeavour by their own intellectual lights. It
becomes an exercise in mere linguistic labelling more than
conceptual analysis. Moreover, even by the terms of our own
concept of law, it is unclear why a legal system that lacks certain
features that Raz considers essential to law’s existence should be
treated as not being law as opposed to being a poor or bad system of
law; it will be law, but not a complete or adequate one. Rather than
there be law or no-law, it is surely better to say that some legal
systems are of lesser value as legal systems, regardless of the

substantive content of their rules. There are, of course, important
implications in such an assessment for Raz’s ‘hard’ positivist stance
about the necessary separation of law and morality.
Imagine a present-day society very similar to that of late
twentieth-century

Western industrialised societies, like the

United Kingdom, the United States of

America or Canada.

Following an unanticipated and sudden series of economic crises
as well as natural disasters, a coup d’état overthrows the
government and a

theocracy is installed. Rule is brutally

maintained and based upon strict Old Testament-based religious
dogma. Opposition is forbidden and non-conformists are executed by
the state. All power is entrusted to local clerics who rely entirely on
the Bible for guidance and whose decisions are final in all
disputes.

Furthermore,

decisions

about

culpability

and

punishment in individual cases are made entirely in camera and with
no judgment or explanation given. ‘Clarifications’ of biblical
interpretation are circulated secretly to local clerics by the supreme
religious leader. Let us call this society ‘Gileban’.43
An attempted application of Raz’s legal theory to this social
development is

illuminating. While it is difficult to state

categorically exactly how Raz would respond, his most up-todate ideas in Between Authority and Interpretation point in

certain

clear directions. Indeed, there are several conclusions that the critic
might draw—law’s validity can depend on moral criteria; bad law is
not always equivalent to no law; and the extent of law is as much a
moral as a factual inquiry. Each seems to be less than helpful

individually and especially collectively to his overall project to set
out and defend an uncompromising positivist account of law’s
nature.
First, Gilebanian society seems to contradict Raz’s insistence
that law exists as something separate from other modes of
value-based governance. By recommending a sharp separation
between law’s validity and its moral legitimacy, his account of law
strongly suggests that no legal system can or could exist which makes
law’s validity depend entirely and exclusively on its moral legitimacy.
The existence of such a legal system would confound the underlying
universal structure and claims to authority of Raz’s schema by fusing
rather than keeping separate law’s validity and moral legitimacy.
After all, it is an important feature of law’s nature that people follow
its rules as law and not as moral imperatives. However, that is what
many theological systems of law, like Gileban, do. The force and
validity of the system’s orders are both directly and indirectly
based upon the society’s religious

commitments; there is

simply no law that can be immoral or whose content can be
something other than its biblical source. What makes a rule into a
legal rule is its status as religious ordinance, and what gives it its
legitimacy is its claims to religious authority.44 In a society like
Gileban, it is not so much that law overlaps with morality and religion
as that they become fused into one and the same thing.
Consequently, contrary to Raz’s hard positivist claims, legal
validity can sometimes and, on occasion, must be determined by
reference to its content or in terms of its larger moral legitimacy.

Secondly, Gileban raises some pressing problems for Raz’s
conclusion that, despite appearances to the contrary, sometimes law
does not exist. One response by Raz to the first critical observation is
that a system like Gileban, whatever else it is, is simply not a legal
system; law does not exist in such a society. Indeed, it seems
apparent that the theocratic regime of Gileban would not count as a
legal system in Raz’s reckoning because it is not in accord with his
rendition of what ‘our’ concept of law would demand. Among
other things, Raz is of the opinion that ‘it is the essence of law
that it expects people to be aware of its existence and, when
appropriate, to be guided by it’.45 Accordingly, for Raz, there will be no
legal system unless there exist directives or norms that are
capable of identification without direct resort to (religious) moral
considerations and that these are presented and operate as
someone else’s, not your own, view about how you ought to behave.
Raz’s basic conditions for a legal system’s existence only barely
apply to the Gileban regime, if at all. People will be aware that the
Old Testament is the only authoritative source of all instruction in
all things; its religious say-so trumps all other possible sources of
direction. However, there will be no public or formal guidance
available as to how to interpret its particular or competing
demands in contentious circumstances. Gilebanians will simply
have to hope (and pray?) that their actions comply with the Bible’s
directives as interpreted by themselves. They will have no reliable exante (or even ex-post) means of informing themselves about how to
behave properly and legally in any circumstances, let alone where

there is uncertainty or doubt. Official caprice or revelation, not
authoritative rules, will be very much the civic order of the day.
Moreover, law’s essential Razian role as a mediating structure of
authoritative guidance in people’s practical reasoning will be fatally
compromised.
However, if Raz is too quick and too wide-ranging in declaring
that states like Gileban have only a pseudo-system of law, he will
have undercut even further not only the universalistic claims of his
legal theory, but also its practical plausibility. Raz states that a
concept of law ‘is not a concept introduced by academics to help with
explaining some social phenomena; rather it is‘a concept
entrenched in our society’s self-understanding’ of what it is ‘to
see certain institutions as legal’.46 Mindful also that he observes
that ‘we know that the regulations of a golf club are not a legal
system, and that independent states have legal systems’,47 it is
puzzling why Gileban would not be considered to have a legal
system even when viewed through the lens of our own concept of
law: it is an independent state and claims authority over its
members. It would surely be more sensible and convincing to
report that our society’s self-understanding would more likely than
not see Gileban society as possessing a legal system, but a
tyrannical or rudimentary one. To conclude otherwise would run
the real risk that Raz had fallen into the very trap he highlights of
treating the concept of law as ‘a concept introduced by academics to
help with explaining some social phenomena’.48 As such, Raz’s likely
consignment of Gileban to the realm of non-law would seem hasty

and self-defeating at best. Put more generally, it is more reasonably
the case that legal systems tend to fade into non-law than become
such in one fell swoop.
Thirdly (and this follows closely from the second observation),
Raz’s probable treatment of Gileban as non-law raises some further
and telling concerns about the extent to which his positivist theory of
law-as-a-social-fact is insulated from moral considerations as he
maintains. When I suggested that ‘our’ people would treat
Gileban as a bad legal system (ie, as a tyrannical or minimal
one), there was obviously an explicit evaluative appraisal involved;
those legal systems that have open courts are more deserving and
defensible than those that deploy a decidedly StarChamber
approach to the resolution of disputes. However, if this were
simply offered as an external judgement about the substantive
content of particular legal rules, then it would obviously present no
challenge to Raz’s positivist account. He would rightly point out
that the value-based evaluation of legal rules is entirely in line with
his insistence that a strict separation of law’s validity and its
moral legitimacy is to be preserved. Unfortunately, in the case of
Gileban’s ‘legal’ system, this Razian riposte is not so readily
available.
My challenge to Raz’s account is not so much about the content of
any particular rule, it is more about the lack of any legal rules per se
that people can know and be guided by in their daily social lives. The
apparently arbitrary definition of particular wrongdoing and the
unpredictable imposition of specific punishment, at least as

experienced by the Gileban laity as opposed to its clerical elite,
offends what many think of as the Rule of Law. While this failure to
live up to such expectations is not automatically considered to
deprive the system of its status as law, it is generally accepted that
promulgated rules, due process, etc are vital components in any legal
system that warrants support and approval. So, for instance, the
continued existence of the detention centre at Guantanamo Bay
might well be considered as an affront to many lawyers’ and citizens’
notions of what counts as a civilised and defensible process of
governance, but few would go so far as to say that there is no legal
system in operation there at all.49 In such matters, a more pragmatic
dimmer-switch is to be preferred to the simplistic positivistic on-off
device.
This notion of the ‘Rule of Law’ is familiar to legal theorists and
lawyers—should it be ‘our’ legal theorists and lawyers?—as an
important feature of valued legal systems, but not the sine qua non
of their validity. Ironically though, Raz appears to have built exactly
this kind of evaluative element into his supposedly positivist
account of law; he has smuggled in a value-laden criterion, but
passed it off as an exclusive legal virtue. In this regard, in allowing
for the fact that there might be better or worse legal systems
regardless of the substantive content of their authoritative
norms, Raz seems to find himself in the distinctly uncomfortable
company of the unabashed naturalist Lon Fuller, who famously
insisted that, if law did not live up to its own ‘inner morality’, it
would not simply be ‘a bad system of law, [but] … something that

is not properly called a legal system at all’.50 This conclusion
seems to be so similar to Raz’s as to be indistinguishable. Although
Raz would still likely insist that the Rule of Law is more aptly thought
about in terms of efficacy than morality, there is a significant
difference between whether tools are suited to their chosen
function and whether law is sufficiently knowable to guide people’s
conduct.51 To use Raz’s example, it is one thing to criticise knives as
being insufficiently sharp to accomplish their cutting tasks; it is
another thing entirely to condemn law for punishing people when
they have no idea why and for what they are being punished. While
conformity with the Rule of Law will obviously not itself guarantee a
‘good’ legal system, its complete flouting will itself be a moral failing
and contribute to the goodness or badness of the legal system,
regardless of the substantive cut of its normative content.
Under the guise of factual inquiry, therefore, Raz has imposed
a qualitative dimension to law’s existence and, in the process,
undermined the positivist foundations of his jurisprudence. It is not
so much that Gileban’s particular rules are good or bad. After all,
while

some

citizens

of

Gileban

might

object

to

its

fundamentalist orientation, many citizens may well find its strict
adherence to biblical morality to be exemplary. The problem is
that the failure to make those rules knowable to the public so that,
when in doubt as to how to act, they might be practically and
authoritatively guided by them (and not their own unmediated
reasoning and interpretation) renders Gileban’s legal system a less
appealing legal

system qua legal system. Contrary to Raz’s

protestations, legal systems can be better or worse along a sliding
evaluative scale rather than simply being law or non-law. Moreover,
the fact that Fuller, unlike Raz, tends to utilise conformity with this
‘inner morality’ more as a grounding for the moral obligation to
obey or apply the law does not in itself change the fact that Raz’s
reliance on these value-based criterion undercuts his social-fact
thesis for law’s existence. In Gileban, there is simply no fact-of-thematter when it comes to law: there is no normal situation in which the
law does a reasonable job at guiding conduct and thereby
functioning as a viable

mediating authoritative structure for

practical reasoning. People will have no choice other than to resort to
their own reasons for action based on their own efforts to interpret
biblical texts to determine the content of Gileban’s rules; there will
be no possibility of relying only on law’s authoritative directives as
they only exist after the fact.
Accordingly, while Raz recognises that there are many connections
between law and morality and some necessary ones at that, he
wants to hang on tenaciously to his definitive claim that there are
some disconnections which must be appreciated and preserved if a
positivist theory is to retain its intellectual credibility and analytical
force. Yet, his authority-based account of law seems to flout that claim
in significant ways. Of course, too much law can be as problematic
as too little law; legalism can be as enfeebling for social justice as
anarchy or totalitarianism. Nevertheless, although Raz claims to
be indifferent to the moral qualities of law, he has managed to put in
place an evaluative threshold to law’s existence. By allowing

evaluative considerations to infiltrate his positivist account of law,
he has softened his selfimposed hard stance on the need to keep
questions of legal validity separate from those of moral legitimacy.
None of this challenges the basic and salutary positivist precept
that law can be a vehicle for immorality as much as it can be a
bulwark against it.52 However, what it does suggest is that, if Raz is
considered to be the most die-hard of positivists in his adherence to a
strict law/morality divide, then both Raz and other positivists are left
very exposed and in need of much greater defence than is presently
on offer in Between Authority and Interpretation.

IV. OF OBJECTS AND OBJECTIONS

Raz places great weight on the distinction between law-making,
law and lawapplication. In the Razian scheme of things, it is only law
that is autonomous from moral considerations, not its making or its
interpretive application: ‘the distinction between identifying the law
and changing it is basic to the law, and central to any coherent
understanding of judicial decision-making’.53 For Raz, there is a sharp
and crucial distinction between reasoning to fix the content of law
at any point in time ‘without resort to evaluative considerations’54
and reasoning to apply that law to particular circumstances and
situations: one is reasoning to law’s premises, whereas the other is
reasoning from law’s premises. This is a crucial distinction and goes
some way towards vindicating his central positivist claim that law

can be identified as a social fact. However, even if law-application is
interpretive and, therefore, fraught with values, Raz reminds us
that, once interpretation is complete in a particular

case, the

resulting interpretation is absorbed into the law, which can again
can be identified and fixed as a fact-of-the-matter. Therefore, while
moral considerations feature in the adjudicative application of legal
rules, they do not become law until they are incorporated by way of a
legal decision.
Understood in this way, it is obvious that Raz must be able to
demonstrate that

law can be identified independently of

interpretation. He does this by drawing a comparison between art
interpretation and legal interpretation. To begin with, he
acknowledges that ‘there is meaning in the world only where it was invested
with meaning by human beings’.55 Nevertheless, its human quality
means that it is value-laden, but does not render it an ‘anything
goes’ free-for-all. There may well be no one fixed interpretive
meaning available, but ‘there is no conflict or tension between
pluralism and objectivity as such’.56 In interpreting art, music or
literature, he maintains that ‘a good interpretation is one that
explains the meaning of its object’.57 Most importantly, Raz insist
that ‘interpretations explain and do not change their objects;
… what they affect is the meaning, not the object which it has’.58
Consequently, all interpretation is a value-infused engagement
with the original which gravitates inevitably between fidelity and
fecundity. Innovative interpretations are still
meaning, but ‘they show the object in a new light’.59

explanations of

As regards legal interpretation, Raz maintains a similar line by
proposing that ‘the decisions of legal authorities are the primary
objects, and through interpreting them we gain understanding of
the content of the law, which they create’.60 However, Raz is no
formalist. He offers a powerful critique of those who maintain that
legal interpretation is necessarily and legitimately an exercise in
retrieval;61

there is an unavoidable back-and-forth between

innovation and preservation which allows the law to negotiate the
competing demands of continuity and creativity. For Raz, therefore,
legal interpretation is about the inevitably human and value-infused
activity of giving meaning to those original legal resources of
‘constitutions, statues, precedents, the texts in which they were
formulated, legal rules and doctrines, and the law itself’.62
Moreover, when it comes to law, interpretation must be
objectfocused because of ‘moral respect for the law, and for its
sources’.63
By maintaining a strict distinction between the legal object to
be interpreted and the act of legal interpretation, Raz claims to
be able to preserve the vital positivist quality of law as something
that can be identified as a matter of fact rather than by resort to
moral evaluation. This means that he carries a heavy onus to
demonstrate that the identification of law and its resources can
be effectively

distinguished from their legal interpretation as

practical matters. If he is unable to do that, his central claim about
law’s existence as a social fact will be severely compromised. I
contend that such a sharp distinction cannot be maintained. The

problem is that the value-infused interpretation of law bleeds
into the factual identification of law to such an extent that the
distinction is rendered unworkable; there is no available method or
means to identify law as a pre-interpretive matter. It is not so much
that law does not exist (it does, as a body of resources), or that its
likely development is entirely unpredictable (it is not, as a result
of the general political leanings of the judiciary). Legal history and
practice strongly suggest that it is interpretation all the way down; law
is a thoroughly human activity that envelops and infiltrates the legal
resources to be interpreted. 64
It is true that, in law, there is constant toing-and-froing between
fact and value. However, in contrast to Raz, I contend that this backand-forth is so integral to law as to be constitutive of it; it is law. Law
is not something that exists before or after interpretive work; it is
constituted in that interpretive activity. Whatever the case is in art
and literature, legal object and legal interpretation merge so that
one is not separable from the other in any sensible or persuasive way.
While this is most evident in matters of common law adjudication, it
is also apparent in constitutional law,

which is really only a

stylised mode of common law decision-making generally.65 A
marked feature of common law adjudication is not so much that a
rule is fixed beforehand and then applied to the facts of the case; a
rule is fixed in light of the outcome that it will bring about in the
particular case. There is constant mediation between rule-fixing and
rule-application in the judicial decision-making process such that
it becomes illusory to talk about there being two distinct stages

as a practical matter. Of course, the fact that the final judgment
rendered in the case might not reveal this process, or that it might
work to actively conceal this dynamic process, hardly counts against
this explanation.
All this is by way of stating that law is always in the process of
becoming rather than in a state of being—the law never simply is. In
Raz’s preferred artistic terms, it is not simply the interpretation of
the painting that changes or that the painting is shown by
interpretation in a new light. The painting itself changes. For example,
the painting of American constitutional law in 2009 is not the same
as it was in 1809 or 1909. It is not only that its interpretations have
changed; the constitution is much more than the constitutional
document. It comprises doctrines, decisions and principles that
develop and change over time.66 Moreover, there is never a finished
painting; it is always a work-in-progress. In the process of
establishing what it is,

judicial artists and legal commentators

are always repainting it. The very act of interpreting law changes it
and, on important occasion, redraws it substantially; there is a
whole new painting to be interpreted. It is only sensible to talk
about interpretations being ‘conserving’ or ‘innovatory’ in terms of
their political salience and moral effects.
But to say more would be to take Raz’s artistic analogies too
seriously and perpetuate a misleading depiction of law. He draws a
false distinction between those who believe that there is objectivity
and that interpretation is about retrieval and those who believe
that there is only subjectivity and that interpretation is about

creation; it is neither one nor the other. In the legal world, the judge is
as much the artist as the critic or interpreter. Law/art is not
simply created through the interaction between the materials,
the artist and the interpreter; it is found in the interplay itself. It is the
process of painting as much as the resources and the product that
counts as law. Indeed, law cannot be broken down into its
constituent parts without losing the essential part of the dynamic
interaction itself. Because the materials change, the artists change
and

the

interpreters

change,

the

whole

of

law

isgreaterthanthesumofitsindividualparts.Assuch,lawislessath
ingandmore an activity. And, as Raz himself would concede, if that is
the case, then law is a human activity and inextricably bound up with
the values and commitments of society.
Raz is alert to the criticism that, without an interpretationindependent

identification of the law’s content, it will be

incoherent to talk about fidelity or innovation. I would also add
that, without such an identification, the mainstay of his positivist
jurisprudence—namely, that law can be determined exclusively as a
social fact and not as a moral evaluation—will be in great jeopardy.
However, his response that such a critical ‘merging’ claim is false is
typically opaque and enigmatic. It deserves to be stated in full:

It overlooks the fact that the reason fidelity and innovation are often
mixed is that we often have reasons to interpret in ways that mix them.
But this is not always the case. Sometimes we have reason to interpret
the constitution in ways that simply elucidate its content at the
moment, warts and all. Such an interpretation, I call ‘conserving

interpretation’, will be successful if it is true to the existing meaning of
the constitution. It will include no mixing of conflicting elements. It
will display no dialectical tension, and it will establish the benchmark by
which we can measure other interpretations to see whether they are more
or less innovatory.67

This response is baffling as well as unconvincing. First, it is riddled
with questionbegging elements, the most telling of which is that it
assumes that we can distinguish a mixing from a non-mixing. In
other words, Raz posits that there is an ‘existing meaning of the
constitution’ against which a conserving, innovatory or mixing
interpretation can be measured. Yet it is the very availability of this
‘benchmark’ that is at issue. There is nothing here in Raz’s response
that successfully deflects the critical claim that the law as-it-is can
be identified and fixed as an object without some interpretation. It
assumes that which is in contention.
Secondly, Raz’s elliptical aside that a demonstration that the law
is ‘vague and indeterminate’68 still counts as a statement of what
the law is only adds fuel to the fire. If by this he means that some
rules will be ‘vague and indeterminate’, there is no cause for critical
concern; it would be wrong-headed to dispense with any theory of law
simply because it is unable to identify and fix all legal rules with
complete precision and absolute determinacy at any point in time.
However, it is another thing entirely if Raz is claiming that widespread
or structural indeterminacy is compatible with his positivist account
of law. At a minimum, it would seem that there must be some
significantly substantial degree of operational determinacy to law if

he is to make good on his crucial and fast distinction between law
and its interpretation. I maintain that such a threshold cannot be
reached and that Raz’s claims founder on the dangerous rocks of
(in)determinacy.69
Law is much more than a collection of rules that individually
and inevitably

possess a degree of fuzziness and penumbral

uncertainty. Taken as a whole, legal doctrine is structurally
indeterminate and defies efforts to fix its necessary and precise
meaning in particular cases at particular times. Adjudication is
better

understood as an interpretive activity in which the

possibilities of determinacy and indeterminacy are constantly in play
and available. It is not that fields of law appear as indeterminate or
determinate all the time, but that even the most apparently
settled areas of law are always vulnerable to being stabilised or
destabilised and

thereby reconfigured with sufficient effort by

particular jurists at particular times and with varying degrees of
success. The law is not simply there in its object-like presence, but
it is always waiting to be apprehended and fixed by the active crafting
of its interpreters and artisans. Most importantly, determinacy and
indeterminacy are not pre-interpretive features of the law, but
products of legal interpretation.70 Law’s meaning is always
parenthetical and can never be grounded outside the contingent
work of legal interpretation. As such, not only is it unhelpful, it is
also impossible to talk of law’s meaning, whether determinate or
indeterminate, as objective in the sense of being something
that is realisable without legal interpretation.

Accordingly, in the process of trying to salvage his claim that
there is available an interpretation-independent identification of the
law’s content as a matter of fact, Raz has only succeeded in
undermining further his positivist insistence law’s factual existence. If
a conclusion that the law is structurally indeterminate (as opposed
to concessions about the penumbral openness of individual rules) is
counted by Raz as a valid and acceptable statement of what the law
is, then he has given unwitting support to the withering
assessment

that

‘pure

positivism

comes

close

to

pure

emptiness’.71 He has made the price of analytical accuracy the
cost of practical worth. By setting the threshold of describing
what ‘the law itself’72 is in an interpretation-independent way so
low as to be virtually non-existent, what the law factually is can be
whatever we morally want it to be. This is hardly a defence of legal
positivism; it is more of a caricature or even a contradiction of it.

V. CONCLUSION

Raz is an acquired taste. There is little doubt that Between Authority and
Interpretation will be meat and drink to Razian enthusiasts. But his
most recent publication will likely do nothing to convert those who
are sceptical about the worth of the analytical project of legal
philosophy generally or those who question the merits of a
hard/exclusive rendering of legal positivism. Ironically, both kinds of
reader will be reinforced in their stances by exactly the same

qualities in Raz’s writings and arguments. The jacket of the book’s
hardcover version encapsulates those contested features. It is a
monochromatic photograph (taken by Raz himself) of what appears to
be an austere landscape reminiscent of ‘badlands’ topography; it
offers an aerial view of a bare landscape of dry and erosion-sculpted
valleys. In the same way that this spare and stripped-down depiction
of philosophy will appeal to the converted, its barren and bleak
portrayal will also disenchant the more critical. As one of those who
is not persuaded by Raz’s methodological approach or its positivist
product, I would simply point out that law is a much more rich,
complex and fecund territory

than Raz’s philosophical and

photographic imagery can capture; the ravages and revitalisations
of time and chance are inescapable. A full appreciation and
understanding of law warrants a much more colourful, sympathetic
and organic

mode of representation and analysis than Raz

encourages or allows.
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